I enjoyed this discussion. One thing I admittedly don't understand very well: what did decline look like in an advanced commercial city that was subsumed by a larger empire? Would there be outright noticeable technological/economic regression -- for example, advanced commercial farms come to resemble ordinary agriculture in the conqueror's empire? Or is it more about progress ceasing than an outright regression, as the place is gradually left in the dust by the remaining independent commercial societies?
Also, I might quibble with your point about which agrarian empires succeeded:
>Typically, those polities that grew had initial geographical advantages
This seems to describe France well enough, but who else had noticeable advantages over their neighbors? A first glance suggests that many of Early Modern Europe's empires had their origins in what we would think of as not-especially-fertile lands.
Meanwhile:
>Crafty rulers leveraged these initial geographical advantages into permanent growth by:
The points you list here are good, and I'm inclined to think this is nearly the whole story in central and eastern Europe. I would say the winners at the game of empire-building were mostly decided by a combination of successful administrative/military reforms, fortuitous marriages/inheritances, and adroit diplomacy.
There's perhaps also room for theories of collective solidarity -- asabiyyah, Turchin's ideas, etc. E.g. were the Prussian/Brandenburgian people, or the Prussian noble/military caste, more culturally inclined to invest in the military success of the Prussian state than Rhinelanders were on behalf of their own states? We could pose many theories as to WHY this might be so, the most obvious being a more recent history of proximity to hostile non-German and non-Christian peoples and a population more recently descended from conquerors and colonists.
You ask many very good questions. I am hoping to write more about the topic is future articles, but I think historical research in this domain is fairly limited. The vast majority of historiography is focused on one individual society at a specific time period, so we do not know a lot about why big trends (like this one) happen.
1) As for the results when Commercial societies are conquered, there is no research on this topic that I know of, but my sense is that it leads to a long stagnation at the same relative level of development.
2) I agree with you that geographical factors alone do not describe why certain regions are able to grow into great empires. The other factors that you mention clearly played a role.
If you are interested in the topic, I would read my summary of Perry Anderson's "Lineages of the Absolutist State" which I think is the best book on the topic.
Yes, the previous economic competition was between the Agrarian society and the emerging Corporate Capital Industrial Age.
Look at France today and the relative societal power balance centuries into this dynamic... farmer protests in Paris and probably even taking the month of August as vacation.
If Commercialization had been stifled entirely, we'd be in a very different place.
I enjoyed this discussion. One thing I admittedly don't understand very well: what did decline look like in an advanced commercial city that was subsumed by a larger empire? Would there be outright noticeable technological/economic regression -- for example, advanced commercial farms come to resemble ordinary agriculture in the conqueror's empire? Or is it more about progress ceasing than an outright regression, as the place is gradually left in the dust by the remaining independent commercial societies?
Also, I might quibble with your point about which agrarian empires succeeded:
>Typically, those polities that grew had initial geographical advantages
This seems to describe France well enough, but who else had noticeable advantages over their neighbors? A first glance suggests that many of Early Modern Europe's empires had their origins in what we would think of as not-especially-fertile lands.
Meanwhile:
>Crafty rulers leveraged these initial geographical advantages into permanent growth by:
The points you list here are good, and I'm inclined to think this is nearly the whole story in central and eastern Europe. I would say the winners at the game of empire-building were mostly decided by a combination of successful administrative/military reforms, fortuitous marriages/inheritances, and adroit diplomacy.
There's perhaps also room for theories of collective solidarity -- asabiyyah, Turchin's ideas, etc. E.g. were the Prussian/Brandenburgian people, or the Prussian noble/military caste, more culturally inclined to invest in the military success of the Prussian state than Rhinelanders were on behalf of their own states? We could pose many theories as to WHY this might be so, the most obvious being a more recent history of proximity to hostile non-German and non-Christian peoples and a population more recently descended from conquerors and colonists.
You ask many very good questions. I am hoping to write more about the topic is future articles, but I think historical research in this domain is fairly limited. The vast majority of historiography is focused on one individual society at a specific time period, so we do not know a lot about why big trends (like this one) happen.
1) As for the results when Commercial societies are conquered, there is no research on this topic that I know of, but my sense is that it leads to a long stagnation at the same relative level of development.
2) I agree with you that geographical factors alone do not describe why certain regions are able to grow into great empires. The other factors that you mention clearly played a role.
If you are interested in the topic, I would read my summary of Perry Anderson's "Lineages of the Absolutist State" which I think is the best book on the topic.
https://techratchet.com/2021/05/18/book-summary-lineages-of-the-absolutist-state-by-perry-anderson/
“Military Revolution and Political Change” by Brian Downing is also quite good:
https://techratchet.com/2021/06/03/book-summary-military-revolution-and-political-change-by-brian-downing/
Now this is very interesting.
Yes, the previous economic competition was between the Agrarian society and the emerging Corporate Capital Industrial Age.
Look at France today and the relative societal power balance centuries into this dynamic... farmer protests in Paris and probably even taking the month of August as vacation.
If Commercialization had been stifled entirely, we'd be in a very different place.