It seems to me that the main difficulty with the invasion starting in Belgium is that the Allies would be surrounded in all sides and vulnerable to being trapped in a relatively small beachhead. Now, of course, that's what happened in Normandy, at least for a few weeks, but once they broke out, the German forces in Western France were forced to retreat Eastward or risk being cutoff and forced to surrender. But in Belgium, that wouldn't have been the case - the Germans would have had much more room for a tactical retreat and counterattack, and wouldn't have had to abandon France (at least not as quickly). Whether that outweighs all of the advantages of Antwerp, I don't know.
I am going to write many more follow-up articles on the subject of Antwerp 1944. Wait for my later articles to decide.
Of course, there is no way of knowing but I think all of northern Belgium and parts of southern Netherlands would have fallen to the Allies very quickly. Assuming the Allies achieved strategic and tactical surprise, I do not think that this would be the case. To defeat the invasion, Germans would have had to attack North from Belgium almost immediately from Pas-de-Calais, and I doubt that they could have reacted quickly. And if they did, this would have risked uncovering the landing beaches to a secondary invasion.
Remember that even well after Allied troops were in Normandy, the Germans were still speculating as to whether it was the "real" invasion or just a feint to draw off forces from the real target.
Looking forward to the follow-up articles! I'm impressed you appear to have found a WWII subject that hasn't already been debated to death. Very interested in where this goes.
This is interesting. Because the war ended victoriously in less than a year, it's a decision that we seldom see second-guessed.
It's the sort of thing I wish I could bounce off my late father, who obsessively studied World War 2 (as a hobby), and D-Day in particular, much more deeply than I ever have, including obsessively studying primary sources and orders of battle. He loved to discuss it with me growing up.
Two points I didn't see you call out that would seem to be in favor of the idea that Normandy was a mistake:
1. Allied intelligence or planning supposedly screwed up on accounting for the bocage and underestimated the hindrance that it would prove.
2. The Allies vastly overestimated the value of taking nearby Brittany. It turned out to not even be worth the trouble.
As for "Why not Antwerp?", I can only speculate one potentially rational reason that I didn't notice you otherwise calling out: Was there a concern that concentrating forces along the English coast (including air support) for an eastward offensive through the North Sea would have been detected by German intel, which could have concluded that Antwerp was the only viable target for such an operation and therefore heavily reinforced it? The Channel coast seems to offer a wide range of possible landing sites, and with forces prepared for a cross-Channel invasion, I imagine it was easier for the Allies to pivot to another Channel option in response to the German disposition if, for example, it was noticed that the bluff at Calais had failed and the Germans were heavily reinforcing Normandy.
I can also speculate an irrational reason: I've never heard this mentioned, but was politics at play? Did De Gaulle (or other influential Frenchmen) play a role in prioritizing the liberation of France and, symbolically, making a return to the continent on French soil? Did Churchill or Roosevelt believe that France was owed the swiftest possible liberation? Was there an expectation that a swiftly-rearmed France would play a larger role in the last stage of the war than it actually did? Or perhaps, was the existence of the Free French forces anticipated to secure more useful collaboration from the French Resistance and from liberated locals than would be the case in Belgium?
I pretty much agree with you on all your points, especially with regard to military historians not being willing to second-guess victory.
As for the concentrations on the eastern English coast, yes, this is a valid concern. Fighter bases in Southeast England would be a potential tell for the Germans, although many were already there to support the strategic bombing campaign.
Given that the Germans were convinced that Pas-de-Calais was the target, the key would be to not build any fighter bases that were outside of the range of Pas-de-Calais. Deceiving the Germans would be a key part of any invasion plan. If the Germans successfully guessed the landing site, it would have been very difficult for the Allies regardless of the beach.
Being able to quickly grab the Antwerp airport and other air bases in Belgium would have been a real benefit for the assault on Germany.
Port embarkations are a little tricky although the UK has many large ports on its Western coast. This would have led to longer transit times, but more security. I don’t see this as a deal-breaker.
As for the politics of not invading France, I have not heard that this was a major reason for targeting Normandy. Ironically, targeting Antwerp would have been better for France as they would not have been a war zone and German forces would likely have abandoned France without a fight at some point. They could not afford to ignore a direct attack on the Ruhr.
I do know that when Allied ground forces got close to Paris, they were under enormous political pressure from the Free French to take the city even though it was not strategically necessary. Adding on the civilian population of Paris to an already over-stretched logistics chain was also not wanted.
Another possible political reason was distrust of the French Resistance. Contrary to its portrayal in the movies, the French Resistance was heavily splintered into different ideological factions, DeGaulists, and various flavors of Socialists and Communists, which spent nearly as much effort fighting each other as the Germans. Even as is, there was a real concern that France would decent into civil war post-liberation.
Thus there may have been a desire to ensure France was occupied by reliable Anglo-American troops until a functioning, and non-Communist, French government could be set up.
Yes, it is possible that this entered into their thinking, but I do not recall reading about that in the historical literature.
My guess is that US, British, and Free French ground forces would have occupied France almost immediately after German troops departed (if not sooner), so I doubt that this would have led to a revolutionary situation as in Yugoslavia or Greece.
That kind of speculation only works after the war is over and you know the outcome. It makes little sense in 1943 when the decision was made.
Stalin put enormous pressure on the USA and UK to invade Northwestern Europe as early as possible, so obviously he did not think that opening up a second front would prevent the Soviets from getting Central Europe.
Remember also that the US was giving enormous material resources to the Soviets, without which any major offensives against the Germans would have been very hard. That decision makes no sense if the major goal of the second front was to prevent the spread of the Soviets.
Remember also that the US requested that the Soviets invade Manchuria in 1945, which was a major cause of the establishment of Communist regimes in China, North Korea, and in the long run, Vietnam. That decision makes no sense if the major goal of the second front was to prevent the spread of the Soviets.
In 1943 all major allies were convinced that invading Northwest Europe was essential to victory.
As to your point #2, how do the US and UK stop the Soviets from going beyond Berlin?
Without ground forces on the Continent, that seems near impossible.
As for what would have happened if there was no D-day ever, who knows? Maybe the Soviets could have won, but if the Germans had shifted more divisions to the Eastern Front, they might have created a stalemate. They certainly could have done that with Panzer divisions during the winter when amphibious assault in the West was unlikely. And by 1945, they could have shifted almost the entire Wehrmacht.
"That decision makes no sense if the major goal of the second front was to prevent the spread of the Soviets."
It makes sense if you are trying to minimize casualties. There are competing goals in the Second World War. Letting the Soviets take Berlin actually makes some sense (they need that win and they do the dying).
"but if the Germans had shifted more divisions to the Eastern Front, they might have created a stalemate."
They could have slowed things, but they couldn't have created a stalemate.
I think Stalin was bluffing about cutting a second peace. There is no way WWII ends in anything but raping lots of German women at that point.
"Remember also that the US requested that the Soviets invade Manchuria in 1945"
This probably would have happened anyway. I agree that post war East Asian policy was abysmal. I think that the American establishment was too friendly to the commies, but also they just really really wanted to avoid American casualties.
We also have to consider that the bomb and the Japanese response were not secured at the time of negotiation.
I will say that I think FDR (and the west in general) communist sympathies led them to be too pro-Soviet. I think they should have scaled back lend lease earlier, and I think the immediate post war policy was abysmal (they basically wanted to starve the Germans to death). But I also think the situation was quite difficult to manage. Even to one that disagrees with some decisions, they aren't obviously wrong.
P.S. I like the general thrust of our article and enjoyed it.
It seems to me that the main difficulty with the invasion starting in Belgium is that the Allies would be surrounded in all sides and vulnerable to being trapped in a relatively small beachhead. Now, of course, that's what happened in Normandy, at least for a few weeks, but once they broke out, the German forces in Western France were forced to retreat Eastward or risk being cutoff and forced to surrender. But in Belgium, that wouldn't have been the case - the Germans would have had much more room for a tactical retreat and counterattack, and wouldn't have had to abandon France (at least not as quickly). Whether that outweighs all of the advantages of Antwerp, I don't know.
Thanks for the comment.
I am going to write many more follow-up articles on the subject of Antwerp 1944. Wait for my later articles to decide.
Of course, there is no way of knowing but I think all of northern Belgium and parts of southern Netherlands would have fallen to the Allies very quickly. Assuming the Allies achieved strategic and tactical surprise, I do not think that this would be the case. To defeat the invasion, Germans would have had to attack North from Belgium almost immediately from Pas-de-Calais, and I doubt that they could have reacted quickly. And if they did, this would have risked uncovering the landing beaches to a secondary invasion.
Remember that even well after Allied troops were in Normandy, the Germans were still speculating as to whether it was the "real" invasion or just a feint to draw off forces from the real target.
Looking forward to the follow-up articles! I'm impressed you appear to have found a WWII subject that hasn't already been debated to death. Very interested in where this goes.
This is interesting. Because the war ended victoriously in less than a year, it's a decision that we seldom see second-guessed.
It's the sort of thing I wish I could bounce off my late father, who obsessively studied World War 2 (as a hobby), and D-Day in particular, much more deeply than I ever have, including obsessively studying primary sources and orders of battle. He loved to discuss it with me growing up.
Two points I didn't see you call out that would seem to be in favor of the idea that Normandy was a mistake:
1. Allied intelligence or planning supposedly screwed up on accounting for the bocage and underestimated the hindrance that it would prove.
2. The Allies vastly overestimated the value of taking nearby Brittany. It turned out to not even be worth the trouble.
As for "Why not Antwerp?", I can only speculate one potentially rational reason that I didn't notice you otherwise calling out: Was there a concern that concentrating forces along the English coast (including air support) for an eastward offensive through the North Sea would have been detected by German intel, which could have concluded that Antwerp was the only viable target for such an operation and therefore heavily reinforced it? The Channel coast seems to offer a wide range of possible landing sites, and with forces prepared for a cross-Channel invasion, I imagine it was easier for the Allies to pivot to another Channel option in response to the German disposition if, for example, it was noticed that the bluff at Calais had failed and the Germans were heavily reinforcing Normandy.
I can also speculate an irrational reason: I've never heard this mentioned, but was politics at play? Did De Gaulle (or other influential Frenchmen) play a role in prioritizing the liberation of France and, symbolically, making a return to the continent on French soil? Did Churchill or Roosevelt believe that France was owed the swiftest possible liberation? Was there an expectation that a swiftly-rearmed France would play a larger role in the last stage of the war than it actually did? Or perhaps, was the existence of the Free French forces anticipated to secure more useful collaboration from the French Resistance and from liberated locals than would be the case in Belgium?
Thanks for the comment.
I pretty much agree with you on all your points, especially with regard to military historians not being willing to second-guess victory.
As for the concentrations on the eastern English coast, yes, this is a valid concern. Fighter bases in Southeast England would be a potential tell for the Germans, although many were already there to support the strategic bombing campaign.
Given that the Germans were convinced that Pas-de-Calais was the target, the key would be to not build any fighter bases that were outside of the range of Pas-de-Calais. Deceiving the Germans would be a key part of any invasion plan. If the Germans successfully guessed the landing site, it would have been very difficult for the Allies regardless of the beach.
Being able to quickly grab the Antwerp airport and other air bases in Belgium would have been a real benefit for the assault on Germany.
Port embarkations are a little tricky although the UK has many large ports on its Western coast. This would have led to longer transit times, but more security. I don’t see this as a deal-breaker.
As for the politics of not invading France, I have not heard that this was a major reason for targeting Normandy. Ironically, targeting Antwerp would have been better for France as they would not have been a war zone and German forces would likely have abandoned France without a fight at some point. They could not afford to ignore a direct attack on the Ruhr.
I do know that when Allied ground forces got close to Paris, they were under enormous political pressure from the Free French to take the city even though it was not strategically necessary. Adding on the civilian population of Paris to an already over-stretched logistics chain was also not wanted.
Anyway, thanks for your great comments.
Another possible political reason was distrust of the French Resistance. Contrary to its portrayal in the movies, the French Resistance was heavily splintered into different ideological factions, DeGaulists, and various flavors of Socialists and Communists, which spent nearly as much effort fighting each other as the Germans. Even as is, there was a real concern that France would decent into civil war post-liberation.
Thus there may have been a desire to ensure France was occupied by reliable Anglo-American troops until a functioning, and non-Communist, French government could be set up.
Yes, it is possible that this entered into their thinking, but I do not recall reading about that in the historical literature.
My guess is that US, British, and Free French ground forces would have occupied France almost immediately after German troops departed (if not sooner), so I doubt that this would have led to a revolutionary situation as in Yugoslavia or Greece.
What was the goal of the second front?
1) Prevent the Soviets from getting all of Central Europe.
2) Convince everyone that "we beat Germany too."
Fundamentally, the second front was about post-war settlement. If there were no second front, the Soviets would eventually win anyway.
It's not clear that winning faster, especially if it involved lots of risk, helps that.
1) Politically, I think it makes sense to let the Soviets capture Berlin.
2) But go no further then Berlin.
3) At the least casualties and risk to the Allies.
Things worked out that way.
That kind of speculation only works after the war is over and you know the outcome. It makes little sense in 1943 when the decision was made.
Stalin put enormous pressure on the USA and UK to invade Northwestern Europe as early as possible, so obviously he did not think that opening up a second front would prevent the Soviets from getting Central Europe.
Remember also that the US was giving enormous material resources to the Soviets, without which any major offensives against the Germans would have been very hard. That decision makes no sense if the major goal of the second front was to prevent the spread of the Soviets.
Remember also that the US requested that the Soviets invade Manchuria in 1945, which was a major cause of the establishment of Communist regimes in China, North Korea, and in the long run, Vietnam. That decision makes no sense if the major goal of the second front was to prevent the spread of the Soviets.
In 1943 all major allies were convinced that invading Northwest Europe was essential to victory.
As to your point #2, how do the US and UK stop the Soviets from going beyond Berlin?
Without ground forces on the Continent, that seems near impossible.
As for what would have happened if there was no D-day ever, who knows? Maybe the Soviets could have won, but if the Germans had shifted more divisions to the Eastern Front, they might have created a stalemate. They certainly could have done that with Panzer divisions during the winter when amphibious assault in the West was unlikely. And by 1945, they could have shifted almost the entire Wehrmacht.
"That decision makes no sense if the major goal of the second front was to prevent the spread of the Soviets."
It makes sense if you are trying to minimize casualties. There are competing goals in the Second World War. Letting the Soviets take Berlin actually makes some sense (they need that win and they do the dying).
"but if the Germans had shifted more divisions to the Eastern Front, they might have created a stalemate."
They could have slowed things, but they couldn't have created a stalemate.
I think Stalin was bluffing about cutting a second peace. There is no way WWII ends in anything but raping lots of German women at that point.
"Remember also that the US requested that the Soviets invade Manchuria in 1945"
This probably would have happened anyway. I agree that post war East Asian policy was abysmal. I think that the American establishment was too friendly to the commies, but also they just really really wanted to avoid American casualties.
We also have to consider that the bomb and the Japanese response were not secured at the time of negotiation.
I will say that I think FDR (and the west in general) communist sympathies led them to be too pro-Soviet. I think they should have scaled back lend lease earlier, and I think the immediate post war policy was abysmal (they basically wanted to starve the Germans to death). But I also think the situation was quite difficult to manage. Even to one that disagrees with some decisions, they aren't obviously wrong.
P.S. I like the general thrust of our article and enjoyed it.