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Ryre's avatar

I question Diamond’s assertion that some regions had more domesticable plants and animals. He asserts IIRC for instance that zebras are too aggressive and ill-tempered to be domesticated. But wouldn’t early wild horses have likely been as temperamental as zebras, and become more docile through domestication? And the Americas actually had a lot of large animals including I think horses, before early humans wiped them out.

I did like his explanation that areas, like Europe and the Mediterranean region, linked by relatively easy sea and river transit, had an advantage over the interior or Eurasia for instance, where the fastest way to get around was horseback. Easier travel led to more sharing of ideas and innovations, which makes sense when you think about the concentration of innovation in Greece, Italy, and the British Isles—areas obviously very accessible by water. And continental Europe as well with its rivers and coasts.

Stephen Brien's avatar

The within-Eurasia problem is the right test, and the society-type parallel the piece draws actually helps identify what's missing. Both geography and society type are good at explaining structural differences between societies: why one region started with denser populations, more productive agriculture, and more complex political organisation. But both struggle to address questions of timing and sequence, i.e., why one configuration eventually leads to industrialisation while a comparable one doesn't. The question is what kind of variable could actually do so.

The candidate is whether the governing coalition is organised around producing things or extracting from them. Britain in 1760 didn't have a uniquely favourable geography. China, India, and the Middle East shared most of the same endowments. What Britain had, following the political settlement of the previous century, was a dominant coalition whose interests had aligned with expanding productive output. The geography was similar. The coalition structure was not. Even if geography helped produce the coalition, there would still be a question of why then?

The post-1960 record is where this becomes testable rather than illustrative. Of the countries that have made a sustained industrial transition since independence, the patterns look coalitional rather than geographic. Taiwan and South Korea are not better located than the Philippines or Indonesia. Vietnam's trajectory since the 1990s doesn't read as a geography story. In each case, the structure of the governing arrangement — what it was organised to produce — seems to be doing the explanatory work that geography cannot.

Nonetheless, the argument that geography deserves better specification rather than abandonment is probably right. But the version of that claim that might actually survive the within-Eurasia test is more specific: does geography shape the probability that a productive coalition forms in the first place? If it does, geography recovers explanatory power, not as a direct cause of industrialisation, but as a prior condition that makes certain coalitional outcomes more or less likely. The within-Eurasia problem would then be about why northwest Europe produced that coalition when it did. That's a narrower claim than existing geographic theories are making. It might also be a more defensible one.

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